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Introduction 
Tool-making is one of the key defining features of humanity. Our relationships 
to various kinds of tools define the historical progress of our species (Stone 
Age, Bronze Age, Industrial Revolutions), our social organization (Marx & 
Engels 1976) and, with the advent of the Anthropocene, our relationship to 
nature (Jandrić 2017). Ancient tools, such as a stone knife or hammer, are of an 
individual nature—it takes one person to make, use and dispose of them. How-
ever, at least since the Industrial Revolutions, tools have grown much more 
complex; these days, it takes thousands of people to design, produce and dis-
pose of a ‘simple’ smartphone that any 3-year-old can use. The collective nature 
of modern technologies has strongly contributed to the organization of society 
including, but not limited to, the division of labour. Primitive  tool-making of 
the past has become the technique of the present—the social, economic and 
technological way of arranging our daily affairs (see e.g. Ellul 1964; Stiegler 
1998; Horkheimer & Adorno 2002). With the advent of computers, digital 
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technologies have permeated human lives and this has inspired development 
of a more nuanced postdigital approach to relationships between human beings 
and technologies. ‘The postdigital is hard to define; messy; unpredictable; digi-
tal and analog; technological and non-technological; biological and informa-
tional. The postdigital is both a rupture in our existing theories and their con-
tinuation’ (Jandrić et al. 2018: 895). The postdigital challenge is equally about 
the ability ‘to understand the processes of quantum computing, complexity 
science, and deep learning as they constitute the emerging techno-science 
global system and its place within a capitalist system that itself is transformed 
by these developments’ (Peters & Besley 2019: 40) and about ‘making at least 
a small leap from the standard academic paradigm of individual knowledge 
development towards new forms of collective intelligence’ (Jandrić 2019: 2). It 
is within the postdigital paradigm that this chapter enquires into the relation-
ships between technological unemployment and its educational discontents. 
One of the key promises of technology is the world without work: a utopian 
vision, where people do what they please while machines do all (or most) of 
the daily work for us. Historically, this promise has been explored in fictional 
and semi-fictional domains such as science fiction and futurism. However, the 
increasing digitization and automatization of jobs which had up until yester-
day been reserved for humans—such as driving, curing people and academic 
research—has turned these fictional accounts into possible future scenarios 
(see, for instance, Peters 2017; Peters & Jandrić 2018a; Peters, Jandrić & Means 
2019). The promise of technological unemployment is not all sunshine and 
roses. Actually, at least since the proverbial 18th-century weaver Ned Ludd 
smashed his two knitting frames in a ‘fit of passion’ (Alsen 2000: 43), people 
have strongly opposed the idea of replacing their work with machines. One 
of the major arguments for such Luddite fear of technology was the loss of 
jobs; however, technologies of the past have always somehow managed to cre-
ate more jobs than they destroyed. 
Recent research indicates that digital technologies of today may be different. 
Some authors think that we have arrived at a sort of Fukuyamian (1992) ‘end 
of history’ where digital technologies have finally started to destroy more jobs 
than they create (Brynjolfsson & McAfee 2011; Frey & Osborne 2013; Frey & 
Osborne 2015). Others are more careful and claim that we have no right to 
that type of historical exceptionism—while they cannot explain exactly how 
digital technologies might create more jobs than they erase, they have faith in 
the old saying that history will somehow repeat itself (MacCarthy 2014; Sum-
mers 2014). Currently, we do not have enough information to take sides in this 
debate. This implies that we need to carefully examine three possible scenarios: 
(1) the future where digital technologies will create roughly an equal number 
of jobs as they will destroy; (2) the future where digital technologies will create 
more jobs than they will destroy; (3) the future where digital technologies will 
destroy more jobs than they will create. However, the first scenario and the sec-
ond scenario have repeated many times, while the third scenario is still an open 
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book. In this chapter, therefore, we examine an imagined future where digital 
technologies will destroy more jobs than they will create. 
We examine negative projections of such a future and its educational aspects 
in three steps. We first undertake an extensive literature review to identify the 
main reasons why people from various historical periods and working in vari-
ous fields have perceived technological unemployment as a threat. We then 
move on to explore an overview of contemporary concerns based on our recent 
work (Peters, Jandrić, & Means 2019). Finally, we examine educational discon-
tent of technological unemployment as an agent of change.
The Luddite Fantasy? 
While historically, waves of technological advancement and demographic 
change have led to increased prosperity, productivity and job creation, this 
does not mean these transitions were free of risk or difficulty (World Economic 
Forum 2016). 
Since the dawn of the industrial age, a recurrent fear has been that 
 technological change will spawn mass unemployment. Neoclassical 
economists predicted that this would not happen, because people would 
find other jobs, albeit possibly after a long period of painful adjustment. 
By and large, that prediction has proven to be correct. (Rogoff 2012)
Rogoff adds that, although there have been problems of inequalities and wars, 
‘two hundred years of breath-taking innovation since the dawn of the industrial 
age have produced rising living standards for ordinary people in much of the 
world, with no sharply rising trend for unemployment’ (2012). Across much 
(but not all) of the world, people now live longer, work many fewer hours and 
lead healthier lives. All good arguments for technological progress then, but 
does this mean that a historical fear of machines versus human labour was 
wrong? When, in 1812, textile-making machines at the dawn of the Industrial 
Revolution were smashed in the belief that these new contraptions would put 
hand-weavers out of work, were such worries unfounded and is the  end-of-work 
argument simply the Luddite fallacy?
Thompson (2015) suggests we should not drop these concerns too quickly. 
Some economists are now beginning to worry that the Luddites were not wrong, 
just premature (Krugman 2013; Skidelsky 2013; Skidelsky 2014; Thompson 
2015). However, Skidelsky (2014) reminds us that David Ricardo, the most 
influential economist of the 19th century, was stating precisely this, in his chap-
ter on machinery in On the principles of political economy and  taxation (1817). 
Ricardo, discussing the substitution of machines for human labour, commented 
that the ‘same cause which may increase the net revenue of the country, may at 
the same time render the population redundant’ and therefore 
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the opinion entertained by the laboring class, that the employment of 
machinery is frequently detrimental to their interests, is not founded 
on prejudice and error, but is conformable to the correct principles of 
political economy. (Ricardo 1817)
If this is the case, then Martin Ford, in The rise of the robots: technology and 
the threat of a jobless future, takes us forward from the Industrial Revolution to 
the present day by providing a simple hypothetical technology narrative that 
expands on the eras that have followed. Ford discusses the golden era from 
1947 to 1973, as characterized by significant technological progress and strong 
productivity growth, where innovations were primarily mechanical, chemical 
and in aerospace engineering. Soaring productivity during this time period 
made workers more valuable—and allowed them to command higher wages 
(Ford 2015: 51). Then, in the 1970s, productivity fell, as the economy received 
a major shock from the oil crisis and entered an unprecedented period of high 
unemployment combined with high inflation and a lower rate of innovation, as 
continued technological progress became more difficult. The 1980s, however, 
saw increased innovation, focused now in the information technology sector. 
Ford suggests that this type of innovation had a different impact on workers: for 
those with the right skill set, computers increased their value, just as the inno-
vations in the post-war era had done for nearly everyone (ibid.: 51). For others, 
though, it meant their jobs were destroyed or deskilled, making these workers 
less valuable, until they were able to retrain for jobs that leveraged computer 
technology (ibid.: 52). 
The 1990s then saw IT innovation accelerate even more, with the Internet 
taking off widely in the second half of the decade. Ford suggests that trends 
that began in the 1980s continued, but the decade also saw creation of mil-
lions of new jobs, especially in the IT sector. The recession of 1990–1991 was 
followed by a jobless recovery as workers, many of whom had lost good mid-
range jobs, struggled to find new positions. The job market gradually became 
more polarized and, in the years following 2000, information technology con-
tinued its acceleration. Productivity rose, as businesses became better at taking 
full advantage of new innovations (Ford 2015: 52). Throughout the economy, 
 computers and machines were increasingly replacing workers, rather than 
making them more valuable, and wage increases fell far short of growth in pro-
ductivity, with jobless recoveries becoming the norm (ibid.: 52). This  simple 
account is intended by Ford not to downplay other factors such as globali-
zation, the growth of the financial sector and other political changes, but to 
emphasize the consistent role of technology within these changes. 
Avent (2016) picks up this tale in The wealth of humans, where he describes 
the present as a troubling political moment, which our failure to recognize and 
address the difficulties created by the digital revolution has ushered us into. 
Avent suggests the digital revolution is:
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Putting us into the shoes of our great-great-grandparents: those who 
first experienced the transmission of a human voice across an electrical 
wire, who watched as the time to travel from one city to a distant other 
shrank from weeks to hours and who found themselves displaced as 
smiths or farmhands by fantastic new technologies. We have all found 
our working lives altered by it. (ibid.:2)
An important difference can be noted here though. Where the Industrial Revo-
lution unfolded over centuries, our current technology revolutions are happen-
ing over years. The technologies of the future are those of the 2020s and therefore 
significant changes to the world of work are no longer distant, but imminent. 
Avent argues that the digital revolution alters work in three ways: first, through 
automation, as new technologies replace a range of workers; second, globali-
zation has become supercharged through powerful information technology; 
and, third, technology massively boosts the productivity of some highly skilled 
workers, enabling fewer people to achieve what would once have taken very 
many more humans to accomplish. Therefore, automation, globalization and 
the rising productivity of a few are combining to generate an abundance of 
labour: a wealth of humans (Avent 2016). The global economy, according to 
Avent, is now misfiring in worrying ways, as it tries to digest unprecedented 
conditions that are disrupting our world. Work, alongside  family, is a crucial 
aspect of social infrastructure that can no longer be counted on to fulfil the 
range of roles we have for so long attributed to it. From ordering the day, pro-
viding purchasing power and contributing to the community, as these factors 
can no longer be taken as given, Avent suggests something will have to give, as 
we struggle to find substitutes. So, is the substitute really a world without work?
Historically, this utopian vision has once resided in the imagination of writ-
ers and directors of movies. While technology is indeed not destiny (Feenberg 
2002), technological development often feels as though it is the main factor 
determining the direction that we move in. Science fiction offers us a route 
to imagine how society could function differently, in both good or bad ways, 
increasing our awareness of futures we might want to avoid, or indeed those 
we might want to progress towards. For example, in Brave new world, Aldous 
Huxley (1932) envisages a dystopian world where technology might take us 
in the future, with routine genetic engineering and elimination of unhappi-
ness. His story has since been considered to be prophetic. Later, in Huxley’s 
Island (1962), inhabitants have for 120 years resisted capitalism, consumerism 
and technology. Then there are movies that introduce technologies that just a 
few years later are here in reality. For example, to create the high-tech world 
of 2054 for sci-fi blockbuster Minority report, director Steven Spielberg (2002) 
consulted with an expert team of futurists, including computer scientists, phi-
losophers, artists and architects, with the wish for the toys he featured to come 
true. The movie, released in 2002, portrayed multi-touch interfaces and retina 
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scanners that are now routinely in use and the film has inspired many entrepre-
neurs and companies to innovate (Chung 2014). 
Although a common theme is a world where humans do less work and 
machines do more, which should be a good problem to have, the prospect of 
this becoming a reality in the same way as a touch screen seems often to be 
met with controversy or it is studiously ignored. Falkner questions why, when 
machines have been saving humans time for decades, we have not yet reached 
a leisure-oriented future (2017). Referring to implications of block chain tech-
nologies for international trade that can automate work that was manual and 
error-prone, bringing benefits with less human labour, Falkner believes we will 
soon see a real reduction in human work, as promised for decades. He reminds 
us that John Maynard Keynes in 1930 suggested we would be working 30 hours 
a week by 2030 and our problem would be too much free time. Yet, during the 
1980s, working harder, for longer, somehow became desirable and demandable 
by employers (ibid.). This brings into play interesting questions. Technological 
advancement and the way we tend to think about work are at odds if the amount 
of work we do defines our value as humans. Falkner argues that  overwork is 
often interpreted as commitment rather than inefficiency, and judgments are 
made about those who work less. Yet, visions of a reduced working week were 
once visions of a more effective workforce. Then, additionally, few governments 
will want to cause widespread unemployment as this is understood as linked to 
social and economic issues (ibid.).
With these two significant concerns to consider, we question whether sci-
ence fiction has some role to play in helping to begin to alter such perceptions. 
Menadue and Cheer (2017) suggest that fiction can provide common ground 
for researchers to engage with the public across a wide range of disciplines, pro-
viding advocacy and cultural insight and also acting as an aid to learning and 
teaching. These are important considerations given arguments about potential 
political unrest following a scarcity of work and suggestions that saving work 
is more important than saving any particular job (Thompson 2015). Similarly, 
McKenzie Wark says:
It is commonplace that science fiction is not about the future, but about 
alternative possible presents. Science fiction is one of the things that 
enables you to think through relationships between different kinds of 
knowledge … Science fiction is not always about science, some works 
actually ignore the science, but it is usually about a geopolitical reality. 
(Jandrić 2017: 132)
Avent (2016) argues that the hardest part in finding utopia is not the figuring 
out of how to produce more; we have already managed that. The hard part is 
redistribution and sustainability when the rich don’t want to subsidize the poor. 
He points to problems though too if we adopt a ‘makers-and-takers’  conception 
of the world, because this neglects the social foundation on which wealth is 
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built. Thompson (2015: 11) points to the role played by work in people’s self-
esteem, suggesting the prospect of a no-work future seems hopeless. Yet, a 
future of less work he believes still holds a glint of hope, because the necessity 
of salaried jobs now prevents so many from seeking immersive activities that 
they enjoy. This raises further questions that we intend to explore in future 
research alongside the societal trends brought to our attention by George 
Ritzer,  including McDonaldization and digital prosumer capitalism (Ritzer, 
Jandrić & Hayes 2018). 
Building a post-work society is a pressing project that cannot be ignored. We 
are no longer smiling at science fiction because machines that replace us are 
here to drive our cars and land our planes. So can we, as Srnicek and Williams 
suggest, fully automate the economy, reduce the working week, implement a 
universal basic income and achieve a cultural shift in the understanding of 
work (2015: 108)? That remains to be seen, but Falkner stresses the need to work 
out how to support people in a post-work economy and to accurately identify 
which jobs machines can’t do. Given that we now live in the age predicted by 
science fiction, will we choose to give ourselves leisure, or not (Falkner 2017)?
Educational Discontent of Technological Unemployment
At the moment of writing this chapter, we have just submitted a draft manu-
script for an edited book entitled Education and technological unemployment 
(Peters, Jandrić & Means 2019). Consisting of 23 chapters, the book displays a 
wealth of perspectives and debates about the theme. While we peer-reviewed 
chapters for Education and technological unemployment, we identified six main 
areas of discontent: discontent with neoliberalization, discontent with automa-
tion, discontent with dehumanization, discontent with acceleration, discontent 
with content of work, and discontent with educationalization. While this list 
is far from analytic, it does offer a good glimpse into collective concerns of 
scholars working in the field. In the following sections, we briefly analyse each 
of these areas.
Discontent with neoliberalization 
Since the 1980s, much has been written about neoliberalization of education 
(see Peters & Jandrić 2018b; Peters & Jandrić 2018c). In brief, these writings 
describe dissolving of The Public University circa 1960–1980, which ‘views free 
higher education as a fundamental human right and a necessary institution 
for assuring the participation of workers in the global knowledge economy, for 
countering technological unemployment, and for creating informed citizens 
within a democracy’ (Peters & Jandrić 2018c: 554), and its replacement by the 
Neoliberal University.
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This model shifts core commitments of the university from ‘the quest 
for universal truth’ and ‘the cultural infrastructure for democracy’ 
to ‘quality assurance’ as defined by the discourse of efficiency and 
 excellence, where neoliberal managerialism becomes the dominant 
model of knowledge performance. Structural transformation towards 
the ‘knowledge economy’ is supposed to follow from the produc-
tion of knowledge, investment in human capital and the diffusion of 
 information and  communication technologies requiring ‘manage-
ment’.  Neoliberal knowledge management rests on principles of homo 
economicus (assumptions of individuality, rationality and self-interest) 
that are radically at odds with distributed knowledge systems. (Peters & 
Jandrić 2018c: 554)
This philosophical and structural shift has produced dire consequences for 
employment in the higher education sector. According to Forbes:
In 1975, 30 percent of college faculty were part-time. By 2011, 51 
 percent of college faculty were part-time, and another 19 percent were 
non-tenure track, full-time employees. In other words, 70 percent 
were contingent faculty, a broad classification that includes all non-
tenure track faculty (NTTF), whether they work full-time or part-time. 
(Edmonds 2015)
While this statistic covers only the United States, similar trends are identified 
all around the world (Peters & Jandrić 2018b: ch. 3). 
The Neoliberal University causes different types of discontent. From a student 
perspective, excessive reliance on adjunct work lowers the quality of instruc-
tion—overworked, underpaid and often without their own offices where they 
could see students, many adjuncts are simply unable to meet student needs 
(Ginsberg 2010). From a staff perspective, adjunct work is associated with pov-
erty, job insecurity, lack of long-term career prospects and the lack of tenure 
protection, which results in inability to take on difficult topics in their classes 
(ibid.). From a social perspective, the Neoliberal University restricts upward 
mobility and promotes inequality. The commodified Neoliberal University 
sees knowledge and education as goods that can be sold and bought, and sig-
nificantly reduces the public sphere (Peters & Jandrić 2018c). The Neoliberal 
University is supported by digital technologies, which enable practices such as 
automated testing and surveillance. More importantly, however, the Neoliberal 
University is based on powerful, rationalist logic in policies that might appear 
convincing, but when scrutinized, the discourse can lean towards irrationality 
(Hayes 2018; Hayes 2019) Furthermore, the success of educational systems is 
measured and evaluated predominantly though quantitative means—and the 
use of this or that technology is only a symptom of a wider ideological trend of 
McDonaldization of higher education (Ritzer, Jandrić & Hayes 2018).
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Discontent with automation
Much has been written about the perils of positivist educational science, yet 
this has not prevented neoliberal policymakers placing increasing trust in 
data—a move that has stripped the Neoliberal University of many humanis-
tic values in the process of implementing New Public Management policies 
of various hues and colours (Peters & Jandrić 2018b: 38). Unsurprisingly, the 
rising importance of data has implications for ownership over data. In line with 
an overall commodification of higher education, Ben Williamson shows that 
data about students and staff in worldwide institutions is predominantly col-
lected and processed in the commercial sector. This transfer of ownership has 
profound consequences for teaching, learning and research:
The central argument is that as educational data science has migrated 
from the academic lab to the commercial sector, ownership of the 
means to produce educational data analyses has become concentrated 
in the activities of for-profit companies. As a consequence, new theories 
of learning are being built-in to the tools they provide, in the shape of 
algorithm-driven technologies of personalization, which can be sold to 
schools and universities. (Williamson 2017: 105)
Datafication of higher education is often justified by claims to fairness and equal 
opportunity (Koltay 2015). However, this cannot be further from the truth, 
as large datasets characteristic for higher education, such as results of student 
performance on standardized tests, are far from neutral. A telling example is 
Cormac O’Keeffe’s analysis of ‘the role of various psychometric practices and 
testing theories, in particular item response theory, and their ability to link 
literacy practices and calculable psychological constructs’. O’Keeffe’s research 
‘suggests that large-scale digital assessments such as PIAAC do not merely pro-
duce data about ability—more importantly, they “perform the concept of ability 
into being”’ (O’Keeffe 2017: 133). Data is biased, because datasets reflect val-
ues and ideologies of their collectors. Furthermore, shows Jones, ‘the complex 
systems of data production and representation co-constitute the very systems 
they purport to describe’ (Jones 2018: 49). Upon collection, intrinsically biased 
datasets are processed by various artificial intelligence (AI) tools.
According to Liza Daly, ‘artificial intelligence is the umbrella term for the entire 
field of programming computers to solve problems. I would distinguish this 
from software engineering, where we program computers to perform tasks.’ This 
simple definition describes an important paradigm change in inner workings of 
the computer. Traditional computers, including the most sophisticated expert 
systems of yesterday, consisted of long lines of code which determined their 
behaviour: for every input, such systems would do predetermined calculations 
and provide an output. In contrast, AI systems are provided with some initial 
rules of behaviour, and then they are ‘taught’ by large datasets. Then,  computer 
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independently establishes various connections between input data and produces 
‘intelligent’ solutions to new problems in non-predetermined ways. This is the 
essence of machine learning, which is broadly defined as ‘the science of getting 
computers to act without being explicitly programmed’ (Jandrić 2019)
In the process of machine learning, data bias develops towards AI bias. Result-
ing from non-predetermined ‘thinking’, the AI bias is very difficult to detect and 
even more difficult to remove. In a recent example, Amazon developed an AI 
recruitment software and ‘taught’ the software using its own human resources 
archives. However, the AI showed strong bias against women, and after many 
attempts at fixing the problem, researchers gave up and scrapped the AI recruit-
ing tool completely (Dastin 2018). Data bias and AI bias are currently being 
addressed by practices such as algorithm auditing. However, auditing arrives 
into play only after an algorithm is developed, and ‘an audit doesn’t prove that 
a company has avoided all the unintended pitfalls of an algorithm. The auditor 
might not look at the right set of stakeholders, or pose the right set of questions’ 
(Hempel 2018). Unsurprisingly, such (lack of) solutions provide(s) a significant 
amount of discontent, and even for-profit capitalist giants such as IBM claim 
that ‘it’s critical to develop and train these systems with data that is unbiased 
and to develop algorithms that can be easily explained’ (IBM Research 2018).
Discontent with dehumanization 
Since the beginning of the so-called digital revolution (an imprecise term, 
which we use here only for its face value), people have argued that digital 
technologies are inferior to their analogue counterparts. For instance, many 
audiophiles claim that old gramophones played on valve amplifiers provide 
‘warmer’ and ‘fuller’ sound than digital CDs; as of recently, old gramophone 
records have returned with a vengeance (Meyer 2009). Claims to computerized 
dehumanization are based on similar claims to superiority of the analogue over 
the digital, but consequences of such superiority are now much more exten-
sive. In Automating inequality: how high-tech tools profile, police, and punish the 
poor, Virginia Eubanks (2018) outlines the history of automation within social 
services. She shows that (provision of) social services has always dehuman-
ized the poor, yet automation of these services has brought such dehumaniza-
tion to unprecedented levels. Eubanks shares sad stories of people who have 
been denied adequate health care based on decisions of computers, and of new 
administrative systems in which people are unable to revert automated deci-
sions—more often than not, there is not even a human being who could listen 
to the complaints. Eubanks thus develops the notion of ‘the digital poorhouse’, 
which uses technological tools to control the lives of poor people to an unprec-
edented extent:
Addressing the digital poorhouse can help progressive social move-
ments shift attention from ‘the police’ to the processes of policing. 
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Policing is broader than law enforcement: it includes all the processes 
by which we maintain order, regulate lives, and press people into boxes 
so they will fit our unjust society. The county poorhouse was an extra-
judicial institution, built to imprison those who were not guilty of any 
crime. Scientific charity policed the lives of poor and working-class peo-
ple for two generations, with brutal results. Today, the digital poorhouse 
uses its high-tech tools to infer and predict: to police events that haven’t 
even happened yet. (Eubanks 2018: 179)
Similar concerns can be found in literature covering the Chinese Social Credit 
System where, according to Wired, ‘Big data meets Big Brother as China moves 
to rate its citizens’ (Botsman 2017). And similar accounts of technological 
dehumanization all over the world fill headlines of today’s media. According 
to Gabriella Coleman, dehumanization is not built into technologies; instead, it 
results from interaction between technology and social organization (Coleman 
& Jandrić 2019). Focusing on technological agency, discontent with dehumani-
zation is especially prominent in the fields of sociomaterialism, networked 
learning and similar (Jandrić 2017: ch. 9). 
Another prominent form of discontent with technological dehumanization 
is linked to the impact ‘of increasing digital connectedness and how this con-
nectivity might affect the culture of learning now, and in the future’ (Falconer 
2019: 244). Reviewing Maggi Savin-Baden’s book Rethinking learning in an age 
of digital fluency: is being digitally tethered a new learning nexus? (2015), Fal-
coner shows ‘that tethering is, if not actually a pejorative term, at least a term 
that implies confinement and restriction rather than freedom’ (Falconer 2019: 
246). These concerns are often linked to privacy, and the idea that digitally 
tethered people can never leave their past behind. Furthermore, automation of 
occupations which involve direct contact with people, such as health care and 
care of the elderly, also often appear in dehumanization debates, and provoke a 
mixed bag of responses (Frude 2019).
Discontent with acceleration 
At least since Filippo Tommaso Marinetti and his ‘Manifesto of futurism’ (1919), 
speed and its connection to machinery has been praised and cursed in almost 
equal measure. From Deleuze and Guattari (1988) to a hectic mix of  right-wing 
accelerationists such as Nick Land (2014) and left-wing accelerationists 
such as Alex Williams and Nick Srnicek (2013), technologically inducted 
social acceleration is clearly linked to a mix of capitalism and  technology. 
Applying accelerationist ideas to education and technological unemployment, 
Sam Sellar writes:
While accelerationism has been interpreted as wanting the worst, or 
as the worst kind of nihilism, its unconditional variants both prompt 
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reconsideration of educational purposes and practices and suggests a 
minimal yet consequential shift in educational thought. Rather than 
asking what should be done educationally, in order to save society from 
the risks of technological unemployment, accelerationism prompts us 
to ask: How far can we go in letting go of the desire for education to 
solve such problems? (Sellar 2019: 142)
In this way, Sellar’s critique brings the debate towards educationalization, 
which we explore a little later in this chapter.
Acceleration is a prominent theme in studies of (academic) time. As Crary 
has observed of human sleep: ‘nothing of value can be extracted from it!’ (2013: 
11). Well, sleep perhaps bears no economic value in its own right, claims Lydia 
Rose, but the health consequences of lack of sleep are real. Combining academic 
insights into the figure of the cyborg (e.g. Haraway 1991) with fictional insights 
embodied in the Borg (the fictional character from Star trek: first contact (1996)) 
and in Doctor Who (BBC 2006), Rose shows that the ‘resistance is futile’ attitude 
might be counterbalanced by the theory of cognitive dissonance (2015: 324). 
Here, Rose’s analysis of acceleration arrives at very similar conclusions to those 
in Maggi Savin-Baden’s study of digital tethering (2015).  However, not everyone 
agrees with Savin-Baden (2015) and Rose (2015), and opinion is divided on the 
merits of slowness versus acceleration in higher education. 
Consequently, acceleration of academic time causes opposed types of dis-
content. Some authors claim that slowness needs to return to academia, for 
individual reasons (decreased stress, personal well-being, etc.), social reasons 
(sleep as a basic human right) and improving the quality of academic work 
(only well-rested people can be truly creative) (Gill 2009; Hartman & Darab 
2012; Kahneman 2013). However, authors such as Filip Vostal (2013) claim that 
the academia also needs its ‘accelerative moments’ which are often connected 
to ‘ninja-like productivity’. Yet, continues Vostal, perhaps neither of those is 
the real solution: ‘Rather than choosing between the regressive ethic of slow 
scholarship on the one hand, or the time management productivity trainings 
on the other, academics may benefit from a more level-headed approach that 
emphasises autonomy over their use of time’ (ibid.). Following Vostal’s conclu-
sion, both types of discontent with acceleration of (academic) time need to be 
understood in the context of, and in dialectical relations to, types of responses 
that people are able to offer in return.
Discontent with content of work
Immediately after it was published online, David Graeber’s essay ‘On the phe-
nomenon of bullshit jobs: a work rant’ (2013) went viral. In his essay, Graeber 
argued that more than half of jobs in diverse sectors from finance to public 
relations are useless, and if people suddenly stopped doing them, the world 
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would remain the same. After a few years of research, Graeber published the 
book Bullshit jobs: a theory (2018), which elaborates this thesis in detail. ‘Pro-
visional Definition: a bullshit job is a form of employment that is so completely 
pointless, unnecessary, or pernicious that even the employee cannot justify its 
existence’ (Graeber 2018). Graeber classifies bullshit jobs in five main catego-
ries. (1) ‘Flunky jobs are those that exist only or primarily to make someone 
else look or feel important’ (e.g. liftboys and receptionists). (2) Goons are ‘peo-
ple whose jobs have an aggressive element’, such as the military and corporate 
lawyers. (3) Duct tapers jobs exist ‘because of a glitch or fault in the organiza-
tion’; they solve problems which ought not to exist. (4) Box tickers ‘exist only or 
primarily to allow an organization to be able to claim it is doing something that, 
in fact, it is not doing’. (5) Finally, taskmasters arrive in two categories: unnec-
essary superiors who manage things that need not be managed and superiors 
whose job is to produce unnecessary work for others (Graeber 2018).
Graeber’s theory completely depends on people’s personal insights; the only 
criterion for a bullshit job is that people feel that their job is useless. While this 
approach can be (and is) critiqued on many different grounds (see, for instance, 
Duncan 2018), bullshit jobs are increasingly present in higher education. In the 
publish or perish culture, academic careers strongly depend on publication. 
Therefore, it is very tempting to produce meaningless articles which only serve 
to increase one’s number of publications; to divide articles into sequences; and 
to exchange references with authors of other equally useless articles to increase 
everyone’s impact factors (Jandrić 2015). Also, the increasing importance of 
external funding implies that academics often tailor their research to meet fund-
ing criteria, usually in the direction of abandoning blue-skies research (Braben 
2002). These practices, and social forces leading to these practices, cause a sig-
nificant amount of discontent in the educational community (Jandrić 2017). 
Another important class of bullshit jobs within the academia is within admin-
istrative positions. Numbers are stunning. In The fall of the faculty: the rise of 
the all-administrative university and why it matters, Benjamin Ginsberg shows 
that in US universities in the period 1975 to 2005, the number of full-time pro-
fessors went up 51 per cent. In the same period, the number of administrators 
went up 85 per cent, and the number of other administrative staffers went up a 
staggering 240 per cent (Ginsberg 2010: 25). As a result, shows Ginsberg,
… universities are filled with armies of functionaries—the vice 
 presidents, associate vice presidents, assistant vice presidents, provosts, 
associate provosts, vice provosts, assistant provosts, deans, deanlets, 
deanlings, each commanding staffers and assistants—who, more and 
more, direct the operations of every school. Backed by their adminis-
trative legions, university presidents and other senior administrators 
have been able, at most schools, to dispense with faculty involvement 
in campus management and, thereby to reduce the faculty’s influence in 
university affairs. (ibid.: 2)
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Somehow, such bureaucratization of the higher education does not imply 
that professors and other academic staff are now free to dedicate themselves 
to their main tasks, teaching and research. On the contrary: during the past 
years,  academic staff all over the world spend increasing amounts of time doing 
administrative tasks such as attending numerous meetings and writing plans 
and reports, and media outlets such as The Guardian are packed with their 
accounts of discontent (Tahir 2010).
Discontent with educationalization 
Aoun, in Robot-proof: higher education in the age of artificial intelligence (2017), 
argues that a robot-proof model of HE needs to fundamentally refit the men-
tal engines of students’ minds and calibrate them with a creative mindset and 
 elasticity to invent, discover or otherwise produce something society deems val-
uable (ibid.: xviii). And Aoun is hardly the only one seeking solutions to social 
problems such as employment in (higher) education. Already in 1995, David 
Tyack and Larry Cuban have written about the phenomenon of educationaliza-
tion (1995). In a more recent piece, Cuban explains this tendency as follows:
What ‘educationalising’ means is transferring societal structural prob-
lems to the institution of schooling so individual students and teachers 
then become first, an easy target to blame, and second, responsible for 
solving the problem. For example, national health problems of smoking 
tobacco and drinking alcohol in the prior century got translated into 
school courses for youth about the physical and cognitive damages done 
by both drugs. Too many road accidents? Driver training and complet-
ing a safe driver’s course for high school graduation became a school-
based solution to a national problem. And as you pointed out in your 
question, the harnessing of schools to an increasingly high-tech econ-
omy means that children and youth are engaged early and persistently 
in using electronic devices so that they can easily fit into a high-tech 
workplace. (Cuban in Jandrić 2017: 13)
Currently, students are discussed in educational policies as if they were any 
other type of consumer, simply purchasing a product bearing instructions for 
the workplace, rather than benefiting also from the transformative potential 
university education offers for the whole of life (Hayes 2015). Furthermore, ref-
erences to ‘the student experience’, ‘the ‘body’ of the curriculum or ‘the student 
body’ as if these were fixed, unchanging entities is misleading (Hayes 2017). 
Repeated attempts to ‘fix’ a range of societal issues (such as student engage-
ment, employability, sustainability, digital capabilities) by ‘educationalizing’ 
these into university strategies lacks careful consideration of changes, both 
in demographics across student populations, and in relation to predictions of 
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impending technological unemployment in a digital age. In our recent paper, 
we explored educationalization of technological employment in depth and 
concluded:
The idea that education can resolve the problem of technological unem-
ployment is a political construction which has by and large failed to 
deliver its promise. Instead of animistic attribution of agency to abstract 
concepts such as ‘use of technology’, ‘strategy’, ‘framework’ or even educa-
tion at large, we should therefore give more agency to actual researchers, 
teachers, and students. Policy documents implicitly and explicitly draw 
from taken for granted visions of neoliberal social development and the 
associated understandings of concepts such as education, technology, 
and employment. In order to counter taken for granted visions, we need 
to reinvent these concepts, and the associated policy language, to include 
opportunity for radically different, non-supercessionist futures. Finally, 
we need to create new visions, and imagine different social orders, where 
concepts such as education, technology, employment may acquire radi-
cally different meanings. (Peters, Jandrić & Hayes 2018) 
Educationalization has many implications and purposes. According to Cole, 
educationalization ‘entails the transformed economic relations of corporate 
capitalism’; ‘calls into question the proper role of the state’; ‘entails a future-
oriented perspective towards time’; ‘means a cultural revolution’; ‘means a deep 
respect for science’; and ‘entails an implicit (and at times explicit) utopianism’ 
(Cole 2019). Widespread discontent with educationalization is hardly surpris-
ing, as many of these are implications and purposes are causes of discontent in 
themselves. In the education community, perhaps the biggest source of discon-
tent is frustration—educationalizing social problems asks teachers to resolve 
problems which simply cannot be resolved within educational systems (Cuban 
in Jandrić 2017: 13).
Discontent as an Agent of Change 
At the surface, sources of educational discontent with technological unemploy-
ment identified in our work seem to have surprisingly little to do either with 
technology or with employment. Discontent with neoliberalization is about the 
trend of diminishing rights of academic workers and its consequences. Sadly, 
in our educational systems, an obsession with treating students as competitive 
individuals and as a simple set of ‘attributes’ to bring to the global workforce 
(Peters, Jandrić & Hayes 2018) has dominated recent policy. This is worthy of 
our collective rage at injustices in the contemporary social and political world 
order (McLaren 2006; McLaren 2015), but deciding who or what our rage is 
directed against may require a new global stream of consciousness.
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Discontent with automation, discontent with dehumanization, and discon-
tent with acceleration are predominantly concerned with ways in which we 
use technologies, rather than technologies per se. Discontent with content of 
work, and more broadly discontent with educationalization of social problems, 
are pretty much non-technological questions. Furthermore, our distillation of 
some common sources of discontent from the edited book Education and tech-
nological unemployment (Peters, Jandrić & Means 2019) inevitably results in 
imprecise and overlapping categories. For instance, a good part of discontent 
with acceleration is also discontent with dehumanization and educationaliza-
tion, discontent with neoliberalization is present to various extents in all other 
categories, etc. These categories are only analytic tools which help us to get a 
better grasp of the problem: acting in synergy, their dialectical relationships 
produce the overall feeling of educational discontent with technological unem-
ployment. Here, we see one more surfacing of Heidegger’s idea that ‘the essence 
of technology is by no means anything technological’ (1981). Unlike our poli-
cymakers would want us to believe (Hayes 2015; Hayes 2017), technologies, 
education and work are parts of a wider techno-social system which cannot be 
understood by partial analyses. 
Technological unemployment and its relationships to various human activi-
ties are not cast in stone—the human race had the power to develop a certain 
set of conditions that have created our present, and the human race has the 
power to develop a different set of conditions to create our collective future (see 
Feenberg 2002). Studies of technological unemployment need to embrace this 
dialectic between being and becoming (Dall’Alba & Barnacle 2007); between 
where we are today and where we want to be in the future (Freire 1972). Argu-
ably, education is one of the most powerful forces for creating conditions for 
the future of humankind. Therefore, our study advocates a significant change 
from mainstream, largely instrumental views towards education, with a view 
towards new directions, including those where we ‘begin to teach people to do 
what machines cannot’ (Aoun 2017: 19). While educational systems do prepare 
students for the marketplace, they also contribute to the creation of a (new 
kind of) marketplace. It is within this dialectic that we need to understand and 
explore the relationships between education and technological unemployment. 
Discontent is a powerful force, which simultaneously makes people suffer 
unfavourable conditions and offers an incentive for change. In order to change 
a social phenomenon, however, one needs to identify what it is exactly that 
needs to be changed. And, in the post-digital mashup of the analogue and 
the digital, the physical and the biological, the technological and the political, 
it is often hard to see exact relationships between causes and consequences. 
The  postdigital is indeed a rupture in our understanding of the world and its 
continuation (Jandrić et al. 2018: 895). Furthermore, claims Cox, ‘the rup-
tures produced [by the postdigital] are neither absolute nor synchronous, 
but instead operate as asynchronous processes, occurring at different speeds 
and over  different periods and are culturally diverse in each affected context’ 
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(2014). Conceived within postdigital circumstances, postdigital discontent is 
also asynchronous and culturally diverse—as such, it has the power to develop 
different answers and solutions. In order to change things, one needs to simul-
taneously think and act, and these two activities must continuously interact 
and enrich each other in the act of praxis.
According to our research, the notion of educational discontent with tech-
nological unemployment and its sources is far too nebulous to be addressed 
directly. This is why employment strategies produce meagre results at their best 
(Peters, Jandrić & Hayes 2018; Hooley 2019), and this is where our breakdown 
of educational discontent with technological unemployment might be of use 
for rethinking and developing new forms of resistance. In the struggle against 
neoliberal (higher education) policies, we need to seriously take into account 
their relationships to technological unemployment; while we grapple with edu-
cational unemployment, we do need to understand its many faces, including 
but far from limited to, the human cost spelled out in dehumanization debates. 
Our study of educational discontent with technological unemployment is far 
too broad to develop into a well-defined critical rage pedagogy (McLaren 2006; 
McLaren 2015), especially in the style of its famous pre-digital proponents such 
as Malcolm X or its digital proponents such as Aaron Schwartz. Yet, it might 
provide some theoretical framing and some practical directions for picking the 
right target for our critical rage in the postdigital times to come.
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